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The Willingness to Pay–Willingness to Accept Gap, the
“Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and
Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations
By CHARLES R. PLOTT AND KATHRYN ZEILER*
We conduct experiments to explore the possibility that subject misconceptions, as opposed to
a particular theory of preferences referred to as the “endowment effect,” account for
reported gaps between willingness to pay (“WTP”) and willingness to accept (“WTA”). The
literature reveals two important facts. First, there is no consensus regarding the nature or
robustness of WTP-WTA gaps. Second, while experimenters are careful to control for subject
misconceptions, there is no consensus about the fundamental properties of misconceptions
or how to avoid them. Instead, by implementing different types of experimental controls,
experimenters have revealed notions of how misconceptions arise. Experimenters have
applied these controls separately or in different combinations. Such controls include ensur-
ing subject anonymity, using incentive-compatible elicitation mechanisms, and providing
subjects with practice and training on the elicitation mechanism before employing it to
measure valuations. The pattern of results reported in the literature suggests that the widely
differing reports of WTP-WTA gaps could be due to an incomplete science regarding subject
misconceptions. We implement a “revealed theory” methodology to compensate for the lack
of a theory of misconceptions. Theories implicit in experimental procedures found in the
literature are at the heart of our experimental design. Thus, our approach to addressing
subject misconceptions reflects an attempt to control simultaneously for all dimensions of
concern over possible subject misconceptions found in the literature. To this end, our
procedures modify the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism used in previous studies to
elicit values. In addition, our procedures supplement commonly used procedures by pro-
viding extensive training on the elicitation mechanism before subjects provide WTP and
WTA responses. Experiments were conducted using both lotteries and mugs, goods fre-
quently used in endowment effect experiments. Using the modified procedures, we observe
no gap between WTA and WTP. Therefore, our results call into question the interpretation
of observed gaps as evidence of loss aversion or prospect theory. Further evidence is
required before convincing interpretations of observed gaps can be advanced.
A subtle controversy exists in the literature.
At issue is the existence and interpretation of a
possible gap between willingness to pay
(“WTP”) and willingness to accept (“WTA”).1
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1 The WTP-WTA gap refers to a tendency for an indi-
vidual to state a minimum amount for which that individual
is willing to “sell” an item that is greater than the maximum
amount the same individual is willing to pay to “buy” the
item. Under conditions of sufficiently smooth preferences
and the absence of wealth effects, the two magnitudes
should (theoretically) be the same. Some attribute observed
gaps to loss aversion: the notion that the loss of the item due
to a sale is more pronounced than a gain of the same item
due to a purchase. For this reason, WTP-WTA gaps have
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Such a gap is frequently reported in the litera-
ture, and many broad claims have been made
regarding the robustness of the gap and its im-
plications. For example, summarizing experi-
mental findings about the pervasiveness of the
gap in a recent survey of the WTP-WTA gap
literature, John K. Horowitz et al. (2000) state,
“Previous authors have shown that WTA is
usually substantially larger than WTP, and al-
most all have remarked that the WTP/WTA
ratio is much higher than their economic intu-
ition would predict.” Furthermore, claims about
the power of a particular theory to explain the
gap are appearing with increasing frequency.
Specifically, the interpretation of the gap as an
“endowment effect” rests on a special theory of
the psychology of preferences associated with
“prospect theory.” In particular, Jack L.
Knetsch et al. (2001) conclude, “The endow-
ment effect and loss aversion has been one of
the most robust findings of the psychology of
decision making—people commonly value
losses much more than commensurate gains.”
Such claims regarding the nature and robustness
of the gap have seeped into other areas of re-
search, including law and economics, and spe-
cific interpretations of the WTP-WTA gap
accompany the claims. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and
Forest Jourden (1998) begin their discussion of
the implications of the WTP-WTA gap for legal
doctrine by claiming, “Researchers in behav-
ioral decision theory have developed a growing
line of evidence that people appear to value a
good that they own much more than an identical
good that they do not own.... Researchers have
used several different procedures to demon-
strate the endowment effect.” The research re-
ported here suggests that this broad discussion
found in the literature is based on an incorrect
interpretation of experimental results.
In spite of the enthusiastic interpretations of
the WTP-WTA gap as a fundamental feature of
human preferences (e.g., referring to the gap as
an “endowment effect”), in fact no consensus
exists on whether the literature, considered in its
entirety, supports such interpretations. While
many experimenters have observed a WTP-
WTA gap, others have failed to observe it. This
variation in experimental results seriously un-
dermines the claim that the gap is a fundamental
feature of human preferences. Recognizing this,
scholars who accept the psychological explana-
tion of the gap have sought to explain the vari-
ation in terms of the commodity used in
experiments (e.g., mugs, lotteries, money,
candy, etc.). Some suggest that the existence
and magnitude of the endowment effect depend
on the commodity employed in the experiment.
This observation led us to conclude that further
examination of the nature of observed gaps is
necessary before any convincing interpretation
is possible.
Although our review of the experimental lit-
erature revealed no consensus about the appro-
priate interpretation of observed WTP-WTA
gaps, we did note an important consensus about
the experimental procedures used to measure
gaps. Implicitly, researchers unanimously agree
that experimental procedures should be de-
signed to minimize or avoid “subject miscon-
ceptions.” Like its close cousin “confusion,”
however, the concept of “misconceptions” has
not been operationalized formally and certainly
not quantified. In fact its meaning changes from
one experimental environment to another and
from experimental study to experimental study.
Consequently, a theory of misconceptions has
not been developed. Nevertheless, controlling
for subject misconceptions is necessary to de-
termine whether they play an important role in
the lack of consensus about the nature of the
gap.
Our approach in the face of this difficulty is
to employ a “revealed theory methodology” to
infer an operational meaning of subject miscon-
ceptions revealed by the myriad procedures ex-
perimentalists adopt to control for them. The
procedures implicitly reflect different ideas
about the form(s) that subject misconceptions
might take. Our approach is to assume that,
unless all controls are exercised simultaneously,
one cannot conclude that subject misconcep-
tions have been eliminated.
This observation leads to our main research
question: If we design an experiment that com-
pletely controls for subject misconceptions as
implicitly defined by the literature (i.e., an
come to be called “endowment effects.” We refer to this
explanation of gaps as “endowment effect theory” to denote
that the terminology is not simply a label for a particular
phenomenon, but rather implies a theoretical explanation of
the observed phenomenon.
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experiment that includes every procedure used
in previous experiments to control for miscon-
ceptions), will we observe a WTP-WTA gap?
This question led us toward a natural exper-
iment design. The first step is to conduct exper-
iments using procedures that frequently produce
gaps. If we replicate the gap we can conclude
that there is nothing special about the subject
pools, or about us as experimenters, that might
eliminate the gap. The second step is to conduct
experiments in which subject misconceptions
are completely controlled by incorporating the
union of procedures found in the literature. If a
gap is observed under this treatment, the results
would strongly support interpreting observed
gaps as support for endowment effect theory.
On the other hand, if a gap is not observed, then
the results would support the conjecture that the
procedures themselves produce gaps and that
gaps are unrelated to the nature of preferences,
loss aversion, and prospect theory. If the gap
can be turned off and on using different sets of
procedures, then it likely does not reflect an
asymmetry between gains and losses as posited
by loss aversion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I
reviews much of the WTP-WTA gap literature
and is designed to document two facts. First, no
consensus exists about the nature and robust-
ness of the gap. Second, experimenters have
employed a wide range of different and some-
times overlapping sets of procedures to control
for subject misconceptions. Such differences in
procedures could account for variations in the
results if the specific procedures employed con-
trol for some facets of misconception but fail to
control for others. More importantly, given that
no theory of “misconceptions” exists, if subject
misconceptions influence the existence or mag-
nitude of the gap, then the optimal method of
investigating the influence of misconceptions is
to implement the union of controls. Without a
theory about the relationship between gaps and
subject misconceptions, our objective is to cast
a large net using a revealed theory methodology
in the hopes of determining whether the proce-
dures themselves cause gaps between WTA and
WTP.
Section II reports the results from our repli-
cation of an experiment reported by Daniel
Kahneman et al. (1990) (“KKT”). KKT’s re-
sults are cited widely as support for endowment
effect theory. Using their procedures, we repli-
cate the gap with roughly the same magnitude
they report.
Section III describes in detail the experimen-
tal procedures we employ to study whether sub-
ject misconceptions account for observed gaps.
The procedures reflect the conjecture that ob-
served gaps are related to subjects’ misconcep-
tions about the valuation task. We expound on
exactly how and why we developed and em-
ployed specific procedures. These procedures
represent the study’s central contribution. Sec-
tion III also reports the striking result we obtain
when we incorporate controls for subject mis-
conceptions. When an incentive-compatible
mechanism is used to elicit valuations, and sub-
jects are provided with (a) a detailed explana-
tion of the mechanism and how to arrive at
valuations; (b) paid practice using the mecha-
nism; and (c) anonymity, we observe no WTP-
WTA gap. To investigate one conjecture
regarding which procedures have the greatest
impact, we designed a second experiment that is
identical to the first, except subjects are not
provided paid practice using the mechanism.
Again, we observe no statistically significant
WTA-WTP gap. Section IV offers concluding
remarks.
I. Experimental Procedures and the Literature
We begin our exploration of experimental
procedures by examining the literature, relying
on the so-called “revealed theory methodol-
ogy.” As will become evident, there is no single
view of how to control for subject misconcep-
tions. Table 1 provides a categorization of
WTP-WTA gap experiments by experiment
procedures. As endowment effect theory2 is our
primary focus, we restrict our attention to the
reported studies that investigate the possible
existence or nature of an endowment effect, as
opposed to mere WTP-WTA gaps. Several of
these studies focus on the possible influences of
certain procedures (e.g., experience with the
elicitation mechanism, practice using the mech-
2 To be clear, we use “endowment effect theory” to refer
to the theory that observed gaps can be explained by some
feature of human preferences that leads owners to resist
selling goods because (a) selling is perceived as “losing” the
endowed good, and (b) individuals are generally loss averse.
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TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE BY EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Result
reported
Optimal responses
explained
Practice
rounds
performed
Valuations
elicited
using
incentive
compatible
mechanism
Valuations
elicited using
market
environment
with some
incentives
Gap
measured
directly
using
valuations
Knetsch and Sinden (1984; test 1) gap
Knetsch and Sinden (1984; test 3) gap
Corsey et al. (1987; part 1) gap
Corsey et al. (1987; part 2) gap
Brookshire and Corsey (1987; exp 1) gap
Singh (1991; test 1 before learning) gap
Dubourg et al. (1994) gap
Brookshire and Corsey (1987; exp 2) gap
Knetsch (1989; test 1) gap binary choice
Bateman et al. (2001) gap binary choice
Shogren et al. (1994; stage 1, round 1) gap Vickrey
Boyce et al. (1992) gap hypothetical BDM
Knetsch (1989; test 2) gap hypothetical BDM
Morrison (1997; part 2) gap random/pooled BDM
Shogren et al. (1994; stage 2) gap random/pooled Vickrey
Bateman (et al. (1997; exp 2) gap random/pooled BDM
Bateman et al. (1997; exp 1) gap random/pooled BDM
Knetsch and Sinden (1984; test 2) gap
Brookshire and Corsey (1987; exp 3) gap Smith auction
Kahneman et al. (1990; exp 6 & 7) gap incorrectly suggested sealed bid
Franciosi et al. (1996; exp 1) gap incorrectly suggested sealed bid
Kahneman et al. (1990; exp 1 & 2) gap incorrectly suggested random sealed bid
Kahneman et al. (1990; exp 4) gap incorrectly suggested random/pooled sealed bid
Kahneman et al. (1990; exp 3) gap incorrectly suggested pooled sealed bid
Loewenstein and Issacharoff (1994; exp 1) gap suggested BDM
Kahneman et al. (1990; exp 5) gap suggested hypothetical BDM
Shogren et al. (2001; BDM) gap suggested random/pooled BDM
Knetsch and Sinden (1984; test 4) no gap
Singh (1991; test 2 before learning) no gap
Singh (1991; tests 1 and 2 after learning) no gap DA
Shogren et al. (1994; no available substitute) no gap random/pooled Vickrey
Corsey et al. (1987; part 3) no gap Vickrey
Morrison (1997; part 1) no gap random/pooled BDM
Shogren et al. (1994; stage 1, rounds 2–5) no gap random/pooled Vickrey
Shogren et al. (1994; available substitute) no gap random/pooled Vickrey
Arien et al. (2002) no gap random/pooled binary choice
Shogren et al. (2001; Vickrey) no gap random/pooled Vickrey
Loewenstein and Issacharoff (1984; exp 2) no gap suggested BDM
Harless (1989) no gap pooled Vickrey
Notes: Optimal response explained: If blank, no explanation was provided. “Incorrectly suggested” indicates that the experimenter used a non-incentive-compatible
elicitation mechanism but told subjects that revealing true valuations was the optimal strategy. “Suggested” indicates that the experimenter correctly advised subjects
that the optimal strategy called for truthful valuation revelation. If shaded, the experimenter provided a detailed explanation of the optimal response.
Practice rounds performed: If blank, then no practice rounds were performed. “Hypothetical” indicates that practice rounds were not paid. “Random” indicates that
randomly selected rounds were paid. “Pooled” indicates that the measurement of the gap includes valuations measured in the first round (without experience) and
valuations measured in later rounds (after experience).
Valuations elicited using incentive-compatible mechanism: If blank, then non-incentive-compatible mechanism used to elicit valuations. If shaded, then incentive-
compatible mechanism used to elicit valuations.
Valuations elicited using market environment with some incentives: If blank, elicitation was not conducted in a market environment. If shaded, then elicitation was
conducted in a market environment with some incentives. The type of market environment is indicated for each experiment.
Gap measured directly using valuations: If blank, then gap measured using number of trades relative to predicted number of trades. If shaded, then gap measured
using mean or median of actual WTP and WTA responses.
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anism, etc.). In addition, our analysis includes
mainly experiments that provide some sort of
incentive for truthful revelation of valuations.
Studies using purely hypothetical methodolo-
gies were not included unless they focused spe-
cifically on the issues examined in this paper.3
Each row displayed in Table 1 represents a
particular experiment.4 The first column of the
table indicates the study in which the experi-
ment is reported. The second column indicates
whether a statistically significant gap was re-
ported as resulting from the particular experi-
ment. Each remaining column of the table
specifies a particular experimental design fea-
ture or gap measurement technique. There are
five such columns: explanation of optimal re-
sponses, provision of practice rounds, incentive
compatibility of the elicitation mechanism, the
mechanism used to elicit valuations, and the
method of gap measurement. We explain these
in turn.
Explanation of Optimal Response.—A shaded
cell in this column indicates that the experi-
menter provided subjects with some explana-
tion of the optimal response corresponding to
the elicitation mechanism. Explanation entails
describing to the subjects the substantive fea-
tures or purposes of the mechanism and the
potential benefits of employing a particular
strategy. It is important to note that the level of
explanation varies substantially across experi-
ments. For example, in Kahneman et al. (1990)
and in our replication of this experiment, sub-
jects simply were provided with the suggestion
(sometimes incorrectly) that “[i]t is in [their]
best interest to answer ... questions truthfully.”
This type of explanation is indicated as “sug-
gested.” In David S. Brookshire and Don L.
Coursey (1987), the experimenters explained in
some detail the elicitation mechanism and used
numerical examples to illustrate the mechanics
of the elicitation device. The experimenters,
however, did not advise subjects on optimal
responses.
Practice Rounds Provided.—In experiments
in which practice rounds were provided, sub-
jects gained experience with the elicitation
mechanism while tutoring was available and
were encouraged to ask questions. Blank cells
indicate that no practice rounds were provided.
In some cases, practice rounds were provided
but not paid. These cases are indicated by cells
marked as “hypothetical.” If the practice rounds
were paid, then the cells are shaded. In experi-
ments providing paid practice, subjects made
decisions and experienced the actual conse-
quences of those decisions (i.e., gained or lost
money or goods) under conditions similar to
those researchers employed to elicit WTA and
WTP responses used to measure the gap.
“Random” indicates that the study paid only
a small subset of the subjects or a small subset
of the rounds. For example, Kahneman et al.
(1990) randomly selected a certain number of
the subjects to be paid at the end of the exper-
iment. In other treatments, they randomly se-
lected one of many rounds to be binding at the
end of the experiment.5
“Pooled” indicates studies that measured the
gap using data aggregated across rounds. In
such studies there is no clear distinction be-
tween practice rounds and gap measurement
rounds. For instance, David W. Harless (1989)
measures the gap by aggregating data from 12
rounds before which subjects had no paid practice
rounds. Before the first round, subjects had no
experience using the mechanism, but gained ex-
perience as they proceeded through the 12 rounds.
Valuations Elicited Using Incentive Compat-
ible Mechanism.—When experimenters elicit
valuations using incentive-compatible mecha-
3 Note that the list of experiments using hypothetical
elicitation methods reported in Table 1 is not all-inclusive.
We limited the list to include a sufficient number of hypo-
thetical experiments to demonstrate that gaps are almost
always observed when subjects are not provided any incen-
tive to reveal their valuations truthfully. Including more
hypothetical experiments in the list would not teach us more
than what we learn from the patterns revealed in Table 1.
4 An on-line Appendix provides some additional infor-
mation about the specific experiments cited: the issue under
investigation, the good used, attributes of the subject pool,
endowment to buyers, and the measurement instrument. See
http://www.e-aer.org/data/june05_app_plott.pdf.
5 Note Charles A. Holt (1986) demonstrated that if the
experimenter elicits valuations of a number of lotteries over
several rounds and then randomly selects one round for
which subjects will be paid, mechanisms designed to pro-
duce truthful revelations of valuations will not necessarily
produce such revelations.
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nisms, care is taken to measure “true” valua-
tions void of the influences of strategic behavior.
Blank cells in this column indicate that the mech-
anism used to elicit valuations was not incentive
compatible. Therefore, when evaluating these ex-
periments one cannot assume that the responses
elicited represent the “true” valuations of the sub-
jects. Shaded cells indicate that the experiment-
ers used a theoretically incentive-compatible
mechanism to elicit valuations. The actual
mechanisms used are described next.
Valuations Elicited Using Market Environ-
ment with Some Incentives.—This column re-
veals that experimenters have employed a wide
variety of market environments to elicit valua-
tions. Blank cells indicate that the experiment
elicited valuations outside a market environ-
ment. Experiments employing market environ-
ments and/or some incentives have used Smith
auctions, binary choice designs, sealed-bid one-
price auctions, double auction call markets,
Vickrey auctions, and the Becker, DeGroot,
Marschak (“BDM”) mechanism (ordered from
least (theoretically) incentive compatible to
most (theoretically) incentive compatible).
Gap Measured Directly Using Valuations.—The
final column provides information about the
method experimenters use to measure gaps.
Blank cells indicate that the gap was measured
using the number of trades relative to the pre-
dicted number of trades.6 Shaded cells indicate
that the gap is measured using the mean or
median of actual WTP and WTA responses.
Table 1 does not include information on other
experimental procedures that differ across ex-
periments. These include: the good, attributes of
the subject pool, bounds or restrictions on bids,
cash endowments to buyers, whether the seller
is physically endowed with the good, anonym-
ity of decisions, and the statistical method used
to measure the gap. Clearly such procedures
possibly interact with unobserved variables
such as subjects’ understanding, attention, mo-
tivation, etc., but the exact nature of such inter-
actions is unknown. Such deep issues are not
explored directly in this study, but our proce-
dures control for as many as possible.
Table 1 clearly answers any question about the
consensus concerning the existence and nature of
the gap. In short, no consensus exists. Further-
more, the table suggests that the likelihood an
experiment results in a WTP-WTA gap appears to
be related to the experimental procedures.7
II. KKT Replication Design and Results
This section discusses the experiment design
reported in KKT (1990), which we attempt to
replicate. The results from our replication indi-
cate that our attempt was successful. When us-
ing the design reported by KKT, we observe a
WTP-WTA gap.
We conducted two identical sessions with
undergraduates from the California Institute of
Technology. Each session consisted of two un-
paid practice rounds using induced-value tokens
and one binding round using mugs bearing a
Caltech logo purchased at the bookstore for
$7.00 each. The sessions lasted approximately
15 minutes and subjects earned less than $10.
Payouts were not made anonymously.
The instructions replicated those used by
KKT to test for misconceptions by subjects
(referred to as “Experiment 5” in their paper).
One-half of the subjects were given mugs and
were referred to as “sellers.” The remaining
subjects were referred to as “buyers” and re-
ceived no mugs. Buyers were allowed to inspect
the mug of the seller sitting next to them. Each
subject was assigned the same role in each of
the three rounds (i.e., once a buyer, always a
buyer). All subjects used the list method to
reveal their values for the mug.8 We used the
6 Here we note an important point about methods used to
measure the gap. If the goal of measuring the gap is to
conclude whether WTA is significantly higher than WTP,
then a distinction should be made between direct and indi-
rect measurements. Specifically, comparing the number of
actual trades to the predicted number of trades might not
accurately reveal how WTA relates to WTP. Robert Fran-
ciosi et al. (1996) provide a clear example demonstrating
that this measure might not accurately determine whether a
significant gap between WTA and WTP exists in the data.
The reader should keep this point in mind when considering
Table 1.
7 We did not attempt to include all studies that might
have some bearing on the issue; therefore, the table should
not be interpreted as a “meta analysis.”
8 See the on-line Appendix for an example of the list
subjects used to report their valuations (http://www.e-aer.
org/data/june05_app_plott.pdf.
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BDM mechanism to determine which subjects
would transact and the price at which transac-
tions would occur.9 Buyers used their own
money and were told that credit and change
were available before the start of the
experiment.
The data collected during the mug round of
the KKT replication is displayed in Table 2.
The mean WTP response was $1.74 (me-
dian  $1.50) and the mean WTA response was
$4.72 (median  $4.50). Statistical test results
support the hypotheses that the two independent
samples (WTA and WTP) were drawn from
nonidentical distributions and the median WTA
is significantly greater than the median WTP.10
This result demonstrates a successful replica-
tion of the result obtained by KKT using the
procedures employed in their study.11
III. Plott-Zeiler Procedures and Results
This section discusses our experiments,
which implement the controls for subject mis-
conceptions found in the literature. If observed
WTA-WTP gaps are explained by endowment
effect theory, then we should observe a gap
when we alter the procedures to control for
subject misconceptions. As reported in detail
below, however, we observed no gap.
A. Plott-Zeiler Procedures
We collected three sets of data. Two sessions
of the experiment were conducted with law
students at the University of Southern Califor-
nia Law School in Los Angeles. One session
was conducted with undergraduate students at
Pasadena City College in Pasadena. Each ses-
sion consisted of a detailed training session, two
unpaid practice rounds, 14 paid rounds using
lotteries, and one paid round using mugs. The
sessions lasted approximately 90 minutes, and
subjects earned $32 on average (including a $5
show-up fee). Upon entering the room, each
subject chose a laminated card at random indi-
cating the subject’s identification number. The
subjects were told to keep the identification
numbers private to facilitate anonymous pay-
outs at the end of the experiment. Also, subjects
were asked to avoid communicating with other
subjects and verbally reacting to events that
occurred during the experiment.
We designed the procedures explicitly to
control for concerns identified in the literature.
In particular, Table 1 suggests that a gap is ob-
9 The BDM mechanism pits each seller and buyer
against a random bid. All sellers stating bids lower than the
random bid sell the good, but receive an amount of money
equal to the random bid. All buyers stating bids higher than
the random bid buy the good, but pay an amount of money
equal to the random bid. Sellers who bid higher than the
random bid, and buyers who bid lower than the random bid,
do not transact.
10 A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test resulted in a z value
of 4.8 with a corresponding p value of 0.00; similarly, a
test of the equality of medians resulted in a Pearson 2
statistic of 20 (probability of equal medians equals 0). These
statistical tests are discussed in Sections 6.4 and 6.3, respec-
tively, of Sidney Siegel and N. John Castellan (1988).
11 We note here that KKT conducted induced value
token rounds and used those data as evidence that their
subjects had no misconceptions about how responses af-
fected outcomes (i.e., subjects almost always rationally re-
sponded with their induced values). Our lottery data allow
us to draw similar conclusions about the level of subject
understanding. When viewing our data for the lottery rounds
with a certain dollar outcome (e.g., 30-percent chance of $2
and 70-percent chance of $2), we observe correct reporting
of values similar to the accuracy for induced value rounds
that were reported by KKT. That is, the proportion of
subjects who gave the correct response was the same in our
experiments as that reported by KKT. Yet, when the lotter-
ies for certain outcomes are followed by additional proce-
dures designed to remove misconceptions, as was done as
part of our procedures, the behavior substantially changes.
From that fact, we conclude that data from induced value
rounds or data from rounds involving lotteries for certain
outcomes should not be used to test for the existence (or
absence) of misconceptions.
TABLE 2—INDIVIDUAL SUBJECT DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS FROM KKT REPLICATION
Treatment Individual responses (in U.S. dollars) Mean Median Std. dev.
WTP
(n  29)
0, 0, 0, 0, 0.50, 0.50, 0.50, 0.50, 0.50, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1.50 1.74 1.50 1.462, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2.50, 2.50, 2.50, 3, 3, 3.50, 4.50, 5, 5
WTA
(n  29)
0, 1.50, 2, 2, 2.50, 2.50, 3, 3.50, 3.50, 3.50, 3.50, 3.50, 4, 4.50 4.72 4.50 2.174.50, 5.50, 5.50, 5.50, 6, 6, 6, 6.50, 7, 7, 7, 7.50, 7.50, 7.50, 8.50
536 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 2005
served less often when an incentive-compatible
mechanism is used to elicit valuations, and
training and paid practice rounds are provided.
Table 1 also reveals the absence of a particular
and important set of procedures. Our analysis of
the literature reveals that no one experiment
designed to study WTP-WTA gaps imple-
ments a complete set of controls: an incentive-
compatible elicitation device, training, paid
practice, and anonymity. We fill this void with
our experiment design.
First, using an incentive-compatible elicita-
tion device (e.g., BDM) gives subjects an incen-
tive to announce their actual valuations for the
good with the goal of increasing the probability
of earning the maximum amount possible. Lack
of incentives can be associated with several
features of arbitrary behavior. Although the spe-
cific reasons incentives might operate in such a
manner is not well known, presumably incen-
tives focus behavior in the sense that attention,
thought, and care in understanding instructions
depend on the nature of incentives. If earnings
depend on subjects’ decisions, subjects proba-
bly are more likely to allocate attention to in-
structions and decisions during experiments.
Second, training provides subjects with a ba-
sic understanding of the mechanism used to
elicit valuations. Mechanisms used to elicit val-
uations might be unfamiliar to subjects or, more
important, might be so similar to mechanisms
with which subjects are familiar that subtle and
important differences go unnoticed despite ex-
perimental controls. Many designs use incentive-
compatible mechanisms such as the BDM
mechanism to elicit nonstrategic valuations
from subjects. These mechanisms, however,
most likely are unfamiliar to subjects even
though the task might appear to be a common
buying or selling task. When confronted with an
auction of any type, individuals might tend to
operate under familiar auction rules (i.e., high-
est bidder takes the good and pays the amount
he offered). Therefore, even if subjects are told
it is in their best interest to bid their “true
value,” misconceptions about how the elicita-
tion mechanism works might trigger subjects to
default to the strategies associated with familiar
auctions.
Our approach is based on a presumption that,
to accurately measure preferences, misconcep-
tions about the valuation elicitation mechanism
must be eliminated. The presumption is that
subjects must have a good operational under-
standing of procedures, including the available
alternatives and the mapping of revealed valu-
ations to consequences. Decision theorists
might find the language used to describe proce-
dures to be very clear because they are trained
to give operational meaning to technical lan-
guage, e.g., “true value.” 12 To those not so
schooled, however, the language can be unclear.
In many cases, conducting paid practice rounds
might be necessary to ensure that subjects un-
derstand the procedures and how revealed val-
uations map into consequences.
As part of the training process, numerical
examples provide concrete illustrations, allow-
ing subjects to see the mechanism in terms of its
purpose. In addition, specific examples are used
to illustrate why announcing valuations that are
not actual valuations is a dominated strategy
when the BDM mechanism is employed.
Third, practice rounds allow subjects to learn
by gaining familiarly with the mechanism while
still educating themselves about its properties.
Encouraging questions during the practice
rounds assists subjects in clearing up any mis-
conceptions. In addition, the nonanonymous
practice rounds give the experimenter an opportu-
nity to check whether subjects were displaying
behavior consistent with a clear understanding
of the valuation task.
Providing paid practice rounds exposes sub-
jects to the consequences of their decisions prior
to the round during which subjects report valu-
ations used to measure the WTP-WTA gap. It is
well known that activities in people’s daily lives
automatically place them in situations of strate-
gic interaction. Strategic reactions developed to
engage in those interactions might seep into
behavior exhibited in experiments in a manner
that clouds gap measurement.13 For example,
the use of the word “sell” can automatically call
forth a margin above the minimum that an in-
dividual might accept in exchange for a good.
12 Consider another example. Economists might have a
clear meaning of what a “preference” is, but subjects might
not clearly recognize this property within themselves or
associate it with other words such as likes, dislikes, wants,
wishes, etc.
13 For an evolutionary theory of this phenomenon, see
Aviad Heifetz and Ella Segev (2001).
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Even if the word “sell” is not used, simply being
in a situation that calls for selling behavior
might trigger an instinctive reaction (e.g., sell
high and buy low). Despite this, many theories
rely on the assumption that subjects in experi-
ments understand their tasks and that observed
behavior is not a result of strategic behaviors
evoked by instructions. Interpreting data that
might contain a mixing of motives layered over
actual valuations can prove difficult, however.
Likewise, if subjects mistakenly believe that
outcomes are manipulable, they might behave
according to a strategy the mechanism does not
reward. For example, if a subject is asked to
provide a “selling price” that reflects his valu-
ation for a good he owns, natural instincts might
persuade him to announce an amount higher
than his actual valuation. In fact, given bargain-
ing instincts of sellers to inflate asks and buyers
to deflate bids, those endowed with a good
likely will bid more than their nonstrategic val-
uations. This behavior could be especially likely
if subjects do not fully understand experimental
procedures.
To control for this possibility, during the paid
rounds subjects learn about the intricacies of the
elicitation mechanism and are given an oppor-
tunity to adjust nonoptimal strategies to maxi-
mize their payouts. Most important, this
learning and adjustment process takes place be-
fore the gap is measured, minimizing the pos-
sibility that the measurement of the gap includes
strategic responses or responses that are clouded
by misconceptions about the mechanism.
Finally, anonymity in decisions and payouts
is ensured. Some commentators (e.g., Gertrud
M. Fremling and Richard A. Posner, 2001) hy-
pothesize that if decisions are not made anony-
mously, subjects might be concerned with how
others view them. For example, talented and
successful bargainers tend to sell high and buy
low. Therefore, if a subject wishes to be known
by other subjects or the experimenter as a tal-
ented bargainer, he might adjust his behavior
accordingly even if the elicitation device does
not reward that type of behavior. In addition,
when making anonymous decisions, subjects
might be less inclined to ponder the “correct”
answer as viewed by others, and instead focus
on choosing the amount that will reward them
the most. While we attach no particular weight
to any number of ideas about how subjects
might want to represent themselves, we remove
the opportunity and incentives for any such
attempt.
After the two practice rounds, each subject
participated in 15 paid rounds: 14 rounds con-
ducted with lotteries and one round conducted
with mugs. We used the data collected during
the mug round to measure the gap. In the ex-
periments including paid practice rounds, the
mug round was conducted after the lottery
rounds. In the experiment without paid practice
rounds, the mug round was conducted before
the lottery rounds. The first six lottery rounds
involved lotteries with expected values of less
than $1. The subjects were told that the lotteries
would increase in magnitude, but the first few
rounds allowed for additional (but paid) prac-
tice. All subjects acted as sellers in the first
three lottery rounds and buyers in the second
three lottery rounds. The first set of “large-
stakes” lottery rounds (four in total) involved
lotteries with expected values ranging from $2
to $8. All subjects acted as sellers during these
rounds. During the second set of large-stakes
lottery rounds (four in total), all subjects acted
as buyers. Subjects were allowed to view only
the lottery involved in the round being con-
ducted. Table 3 summarizes the experiment
design.
In the mug round, the item considered by the
TABLE 3—SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTS AND ORDER OF THE ROUNDS
Experiment 1:
(USC students) n  31
Rounds 1–3 Rounds 4–6 Rounds 7–10 Rounds 11–14 Round 15
Small stake sellers Small stake buyers Large stake sellers Large stake buyers Mugs
Experiment 2:
(USC students) n  26
Round 1 Rounds 2–4 Rounds 5–7 Rounds 8–11 Rounds 12–15
Mugs Small stake sellers Small stake buyers Large stake sellers Large stake buyers
Experiment 3:
(PCC students) n  17
Rounds 1–3 Rounds 4–6 Rounds 7–10 Rounds 11–14 Round 15
Small stake sellers Small stake buyers Large stake sellers Large stake buyers Mugs
Notes: Experiments 1 and 3 used the BDM mechanism to elicit responses and employed paid practice, training, and anonymity. Experiment
2 used the BDM mechanism to elicit responses and employed training and anonymity (without paid practice rounds).
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subjects was a plastic travel mug with a market
price of approximately $8.50. The subjects were
not informed of the market price. Approxi-
mately half the subjects acted as sellers and
approximately half acted as buyers. All subjects
were handed a mug before the start of the round.
Sellers were told that they owned the mug.
Buyers were told that they could inspect the
mug but they did not own it. All subjects were
prompted to record an offer (sellers offering the
minimum amount they would accept to give up
the mug, buyers offering the maximum amount
they would pay in exchange for the mug). After
offers were recorded, subjects were prompted to
consider whether the offer chosen was the ac-
tual nonstrategic value and were allowed to
change the offer before committing to it. After
all committed offers were collected (i.e., slips
placed into the boxes), the predetermined fixed
offer was announced. The subjects recorded
their round payoffs and accumulated payoffs for
the experiment.14
B. Plott-Zeiler Results
Each subject revealed a personal valuation
for a mug, either from the point of view of
someone who owned the mug and is given an
opportunity to sell it, or from the point of view
of someone who has no mug but is given the
opportunity to buy one. Thus, we perform a
between-subject test to determine whether a sig-
nificant WTP-WTA gap resulted.
In experiments 1 and 3, values for the mugs
were collected after 14 rounds used to provide
paid practice, during which subjects made de-
cisions involving binding lotteries. In experi-
ment 2, such practice rounds were absent prior
to the mug round. Table 4 contains data on
subjects’ responses during the mug rounds.
Data are reported for a total of 74 subjects.15
14 See the online Appendix for detailed subject instruc-
tions and procedures (http://www.e-aer.org/data/june05_
app_plott.pdf).
15 Theoretically, the lottery rounds could be used to test
for a WTP-WTA gap. The lottery round data, however, are
contaminated by a design that was developed only for
training and not for purposes of measuring a gap. All WTA
rounds were conducted prior to the WTP rounds. Thus,
subjects had extensive training on one mechanism (i.e.,
selling using the BDM mechanism), the meaning of lotter-
ies, the instructions, the procedures, and other subtle fea-
tures of the experiment design before being exposed to the
second mechanism (i.e., buying using the BDM mecha-
nism). Because the BDM mechanism would be more unfa-
miliar in a selling task than a buying task (subjects tend to
have more experience buying than selling), the WTA rounds
were used first. In addition to what appeared to us to be a
logical approach to training, this procedure also ensured that
subjects had money to spend in the WTP rounds, which
eliminated complex explanations of collecting from losses,
banking, and borrowing that would otherwise make learning
more difficult. Mistake corrections, public answers to ques-
tions, and other procedures were also employed continu-
ously, which confound the valuations provided in the lottery
rounds and frustrate attempts to use these data to measure
gaps.
Of course, the data from these rounds are not uninteresting
TABLE 4—INDIVIDUAL SUBJECT DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
Experiment Treatment Individual responses (in U.S. dollars) Mean Median Std. dev.
Experiment 1:
(USC/practice)
WTP
(n  15)
0, 1, 1.62, 3.50, 4, 4, 4.17, 5, 6, 6, 6.50, 8, 8.75, 9.50, 10 5.20 5.00 3.04
WTA
(n  16)
0, 0.01, 3, 3.75, 3.75, 3.75, 5, 5, 5, 6, 6, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13.75 5.69 5.00 3.83
Experiment 2:
(USC/no practice)
WTP
(n  12)
1, 2, 3.50, 5, 5, 5, 8, 8.50, 9, 11.50, 13, 23 7.88 6.50 6.00
WTA
(n  14)
0.50, 1, 2, 2.50, 2.50, 4.50, 4.50, 5.70, 6.25, 8, 8, 8.95, 12, 13.50 5.71 5.10 4.00
Experiment 3:
(PCC/practice)
WTP
(n  9)
2.50, 5.85, 6, 7.50, 8, 8.50, 8.50, 8.78. 10 7.29 8.00 2.23
WTA
(n  8)
3, 3, 3.50, 3.50, 5, 5, 7.50, 10 5.06 4.25 2.50
Pooled data WTP
(n  36)
6.62 6.00 4.20
WTA
(n  38)
5.56 5.00 3.58
Notes: Experiments 1 and 3 used the BDM mechanism to elicit responses and employed paid practice, training, and anonymity. Experiment
2 used the BDM mechanism to elicit responses and employed training and anonymity (without paid practice rounds).
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Table 4 also provides summary statistics for
each experiment. In experiment 1, the mean
WTP response was $5.20 (median  $5.00) and
the mean WTA response was $5.69 (median 
$5.00). In experiment 2, the mean WTP re-
sponse was $7.88 (median  $6.50) and the
mean WTA response was $5.71 (median 
$5.10). Finally, in experiment 3, the mean WTP
response was $7.29 (median  $8.00) and the
mean WTA response was $5.06 (median 
$4.25).
WTP-WTA Gap Results.—The main finding
is striking and ubiquitous across experiments.
No gap is observed. The following statements
provide the details behind this finding.
Result 1. The data do not support the hypothe-
sis that WTA is significantly greater than WTP
in both experiments using the BDM mechanism
to elicit valuations and employing training, an-
onymity, and paid practice rounds.
Support. In Table 5 we report the results of
statistical tests to determine whether the data
support the hypothesis that WTA is signifi-
cantly greater than WTP. For all experiments,
we perform Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests,
which test for whether the WTP and WTA
samples were drawn from identical distribu-
tions, and median tests, which test for whether
the WTP and WTA samples were drawn from
distributions with identical medians.
The hypothesis that WTA is significantly
greater than WTP, when the BDM mechanism
is used to elicit responses and training, anonym-
ity, and paid practice rounds are provided, is not
and contain some hints about the sources and nature of the
misconceptions that the procedures help remove. We pass
these along as mere speculations and conjectures with the
hope that they will be useful in some way. First, subject
misconceptions seemed to originate from three sources. The
first source is the elicitation mechanism and the BDM
procedure, in particular. Subjects seem to make two very
different mistakes. Some subjects do not realize that over-
bidding (underbidding) in the buying (selling) task exposes
them to a loss (if the price falls between the true valuation
and the bid). Other subjects do not realize that underbidding
(overbidding) in the buying (selling) task exposes them to
an opportunity cost of a foregone profitable transaction.
After instruction and, in some cases, experiencing these
consequences, they seem to recognize and adjust to these
features of the mechanism, sometimes only after repeated
experiences.
The second source of misconceptions is the concept of
randomization and the nature of probability. In some cases
subjects do not understand statistical independence; they
seem to believe that they can predict the future from past
events. In other cases subjects seem to believe that a par-
ticular outcome will occur with probability zero or one. As
a result, subjects think that they have the capacity to guess
the outcome, depending in part on an impulse or an urge.
Experience seems necessary for subjects unfamiliar with
random devices to incorporate true notions of randomiza-
tion and the nature of probability.
The third source is the assignment of value to a lottery
where random devices are employed to determine monetary
payoffs. Valuing lotteries is not a common activity for most
subjects, and they do not perform this task with the imme-
diate and automatic instincts of a decision theorist. Basi-
cally, the concept of an expected value is foreign to some
subjects, and they struggle in various ways to quantify their
preferences over lotteries. Experiencing the consequences
of their choices might help subjects familiarize themselves
with the random nature of the outcomes.
TABLE 5—STATISTICAL TEST RESULTS
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test (Null
hypothesis: identical distributions)
Median test
(Null hypothesis: populations
have identical medians)
z p-value Conclusion (  .05) Pearson 2 p-value Conclusion (  .05)
Experiment 1
(USC)
0.079 0.9368 Can’t reject null 0.0392 0.843 Can’t reject null
Experiment 2
(USC)
0.928 0.3536 Can’t reject null 0.1548 0.694 Can’t reject null
Experiment 3
(PCC)
1.738 0.0821 Can’t reject null 1.5159 0.218 Can’t reject null
Pooled data 1.267 0.2050 Can’t reject null 1.3523 0.245 Can’t reject null
Notes: The Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test indicates that WTA responses from different experiments were
drawn from the same population and WTP responses from different experiments were drawn from the same population;
therefore, pooling the data is appropriate. The Pearson 2 statistics were corrected for continuity.
540 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 2005
substantiated by the data in either experiment 1
or experiment 3. With respect to experiment 1,
the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test sta-
tistic resulted in a z value of 0.079 (p 
0.9368); therefore, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the two independent samples
were drawn from identical population distribu-
tions. In addition, a median test resulted in a
Pearson 2 test statistic of 0.0392 (p  0.843);
therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that the two independent samples were drawn
from populations that have identical medians.
These two statistical tests were also performed
using the data collected during experiment 3.
Similar results obtained: the Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney rank sum test statistic produced a z
value of 1.738 (p  0.0821) and the median test
resulted in a Pearson 2 test statistic of 1.5159
(p  0.218).
Result 2. The data do not support the hypothe-
sis that WTA is significantly greater than WTP
in the experiment using the BDM mechanism to
elicit valuations and employing training and
anonymity (with no paid practice rounds).
Support. The hypothesis that WTA is signifi-
cantly greater than WTP, when the BDM mecha-
nism is used to elicit responses and training and
anonymity are provided (without paid practice
rounds), is not substantiated by the data produced
in experiment 2. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
rank sum test statistic produced a z value of 0.928
(p  0.3536) and the median test resulted in a
Pearson 2 test statistic of 0.1548 (p  0.694).16
Clearly the extensive instruction and training
might have removed misconceptions without a
need for paid practice rounds to do so. It should
be noted that other researchers conducted ex-
periments without paid practice rounds and ob-
served a gap. Other aspects of the instructions
differed from ours, however. This fact might
help reconcile our results with those obtained in
other studies. The main point, however, is that
paid practice rounds seem unnecessary in the
presence of other procedures thought to control
for subject misconceptions.
Given the high variance in the data, we per-
formed a check on the power of our statistical
tests by testing the null hypothesis of WTA 
2  WTP. Many claim that WTA seems to be
twice WTP (see e.g., W. R. Dubourg et al.
(1994) and Jack L. Knetsch et al. (2001)). A t
test assuming unequal variances led to a rejec-
tion of the null in favor of the alternative,
WTA  2  WTP (t  5.06, p  0.0000). A
two-sample Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-
sum test also rejects this null (z  4.64, p 
0.0000), as does a test of equal medians (Pear-
son 2  19.53, p  0.0000). It also should be
noted that, while we observe a WTP that is on
average greater than a WTA, the difference is
not statistically significant.
House Money Effect Conjecture.—The dra-
matic difference between measurements taken
under a full set of controls for misconceptions
and the measurements taken under the KKT
procedures motivates questions about how par-
ticular procedural features might contribute to
the differences. One question focuses on
whether “house money effects” might explain
our results. Specifically, it could be that subjects
might be more willing to spend money earned
during the experiment than money taken from
their own pockets. A house money effect might
elevate WTP in a manner that eliminates the
gap. More precisely, the hypothesis is that a
house money effect acts asymmetrically to in-
crease WTP and reduce the difference between
WTP and WTA.17 The following result ad-
dresses this conjecture.
Result 3. The data do not support the house
money effect hypothesis. That is, there is no
support for the hypothesis that money earned
during the practice rounds accounts for the fact
that WTA does not exceed WTP in our
experiments.
Support. The support for this result originates
from two sources. First, in experiment 2 mug
valuations are revealed before money is earned
during the practice rounds. In that experiment,
house money effects could not have played a
16 The individual data from experiment 2 suggest that the
buyer who offered $23.00 for the mug might be driving the
result. Evaluating the data without this high offer, however,
produces identical results.
17 We are indebted to Colin Camerer, Richard Thaler,
and Leeat Yariv for drawing our attention to this hypothesis.
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role because subjects did not earn money before
they participated in the mug round. Yet, in that
experiment, WTA did not exceed WTP. Thus,
this experiment incorporated a direct control
and provides no support for the house money
effect conjecture.
The second source of support is the revealed
mug valuations themselves. The house money
effect conjecture implies that there is some re-
lationship between money earned in the practice
rounds and the revealed mug valuations. To test
for the existence of such a relationship we re-
gressed individual revealed mug valuations
against the amounts earned during the practice
rounds. The regression analysis produced the
following equations:
WTPi  5.77 0.0108Yi
t  3.816 t  0.155
WTAi 5.37 0.005Yi
t  3.55 t  0.08
where Yi represents subject i’s income prior to
the mug round. The regression results indicate
that none of the variation in mug valuations is
explained by variation in income earned during
the practice rounds. Not only are the coeffi-
cients close to zero, but also they are not statis-
tically significantly different from zero. These
results allow us to reject strongly the hypothesis
that income earned during the practice rounds
had a substantial effect on either WTP or WTA.
IV. Discussion and Conclusions
The issue explored here is not whether a
WTP-WTA gap can be observed. Clearly, the
experiments of KKT and others show not only
that gaps can be observed, but also that they are
replicable. Instead, our interest lies in the inter-
pretation of observed gaps. The primary conclu-
sion derived from the data reported here is that
observed WTP-WTA gaps do not reflect a fun-
damental feature of human preferences. That is,
endowment effect theory does not seem to ex-
plain observed gaps. In addition, our results
suggest that observed gaps should not be inter-
preted as support for prospect theory.
A review of the literature reveals that WTP-
WTA gaps are not reliably observed across ex-
perimental designs. Given the nature of reported
experimental designs, we posited that differ-
ences in experimental procedures might account
for the differences across reported results. This
conjecture prompted us to develop procedures
to test for the robustness of the phenomenon.
We conducted comparative experiments using
procedures commonly used in studies that re-
port observed gaps (i.e., KKT). We also em-
ployed a “revealed theory” methodology to
identify procedures reported in the literature
that provide clues about experimenter notions
regarding subject misconceptions. We then con-
ducted experiments that implemented the union
of procedures used by experimentalists to con-
trol for subject misconceptions. The compara-
tive experiments demonstrate that WTP-WTA
gaps are indeed sensitive to experimental pro-
cedures. By implementing different procedures,
the phenomenon can be turned on and off.
When procedures used in studies that report the
gap are employed, the gap is readily observed.
When a full set of controls is implemented, the
gap is not observed.
The fact that the gap can be turned on and off
demonstrates that interpreting gaps as support
for endowment effect theory is problematic.
The mere observation of the phenomenon does
not support loss aversion—a very special form
of preferences in which gains are valued less
than losses. That the phenomenon can be turned
on and off while holding the good constant
supports a strong rejection of the claim that
WTP-WTA gaps support a particular theory of
preferences posited by prospect theory. Loss
aversion might in some sense characterize pref-
erences, but such a theory most likely does not
explain observed WTP-WTA gaps.
Exactly what accounts for observed WTP-
WTA gaps? The thesis of this paper is that
observed gaps are symptomatic of subjects’
misconceptions about the nature of the experi-
mental task. The differences reported in the
literature reflect differences in experimental
controls for misconceptions as opposed to dif-
ferences in the nature of the commodity (e.g.,
candy, money, mugs, lotteries, etc.) under
study.
That said, we hasten to add that our thesis is
not especially satisfying because we have nei-
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ther a general theory of what might constitute
misconceptions nor a set of operational defini-
tions characterizing them. Constructing a full
set of procedures to control for them could be
very difficult, as they might depend on such
subtle features as the speed with which experi-
mental instructions are delivered, the distance
of subjects from the chalkboard if it is used, the
size of writing on the board, how loud the
instructions are read, and the nature of pauses or
emphasis. Understanding appears to us to be a
delicate matter and to control fully for it repre-
sents a daunting task. In fact, we have no direct
evidence that our procedures actually eliminate
all misconceptions about how revealed valua-
tions map into payoffs. What we have shown,
however, is that when an experiment simulta-
neously implements all known controls for mis-
conceptions, a gap is not observed.
Several possible interpretations avail them-
selves. Each is a matter of speculation, but we
list them in order to facilitate discussion. One
interpretation is that WTP-WTA gaps are ob-
served when revealed valuations are con-
founded by ill-conceived motivations to
announce something other than a “true” valua-
tion. Under this interpretation the lack of ro-
bustness of the gap is due to differences in
levels of understanding by the subjects. When
the procedures and method for measuring the
gap carefully control for such motivations, gaps
are not observed. Under this interpretation, use
of the label “endowment effect” to describe
observed gaps reflects an inappropriate applica-
tion of prospect theory.
A second interpretation is that the procedures
themselves remove attitudes that would foster
any difference between WTA and WTP. In par-
ticular, according to this conjecture, by allow-
ing the subjects to participate in both the buying
side and the selling side of the lottery rounds,
objects are translated into commodities for
which neither ownership nor loss plays a par-
ticular part in the preference formation process.
Then, in the subsequent mug round, the attitude
toward lotteries somehow is transferred to the
mug. Under this interpretation, the procedures
(and not the actual measurement of preferences)
play a role in the transformation of preferences
influenced by loss aversion to preferences not
influenced by loss aversion. Of course, prospect
theory says nothing about such a dynamic de-
velopment of preferences. No evidence exists to
support the conjecture, and there is evidence
that works against it. Specifically, in experi-
ment 2 the mug round was conducted before the
subjects participated in the lottery round, and no
gap was observed. Therefore, experience with
the lotteries could not have played a crucial role
in the disappearance of the gap in that instance.
A third interpretation is that the procedures
themselves involve a type of demand effect in
which the subjects perceive that the experi-
menter wants to strip from responses any spe-
cial value of ownership. The conjecture is that
by responding to a demand that the answers be
“thoughtful,” the subjects remove from the re-
sponse a preference related to “ownership” that
would otherwise be reflected in choice. While
the mechanism through which this transforma-
tion is supposed to take place is not clear, the
conjecture itself cannot be rejected using the
data from our experiments.
A fourth interpretation is that the procedures
suggested some particular value as the “correct”
response and that our measurements recorded
the suggested value as opposed to preferences.
As the same procedures were used for all sub-
jects, the conjecture implies that the valuations
elicited from the subjects should all be similar.
Our data, however, do not support this conjec-
ture. We observed significant variance in re-
sponses for each experiment. We mention here
one interesting aside. The test for understanding
that KKT employed and that we use as well (in
conjunction with other procedures) could be
subject to criticism under this conjecture. The
fact that subjects reveal “correct” valuations
might simply reflect their tendency to report the
suggested value (i.e., the certain lottery value in
our design or the induced token value in KKT’s
design). Thus, correct answers under these con-
ditions might not demonstrate that subjects un-
derstood the mechanism.
A fifth interpretation is that the WTP-WTA
gap reflects features of a decision process, as
opposed to a preference. Plott (1996) advances
a “discovered preference hypothesis,” positing
that responses in experiments reflect a type of
internal search process in which subjects use
paid practice rounds along with trial and error to
“discover” what their preferences are. As the
subjects gain experience, they begin to discover
their preferences, which are then reflected in
543VOL. 95 NO. 3 PLOTT AND ZEILER: WTP–WTA GAPS AND EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
their behavior. The hypothesis is that stages of
the process can be identified and during the
initial stages, when the situation is least familiar
to the subject, the effects of framing are most
important. Under this interpretation prospect
theory itself emerges as a stage of the process.
Rather than describing a feature of preferences,
the theory describes the features of an early
stage of the preference discovery process. Un-
der this interpretation prospect theory becomes
part of a theory of how the process of cognition
interacts with preference formation and deci-
sion making.
We do not take a stand on which of these
interpretations is valid or answerable by our
literature review and experimental results. In
fact, we disagree on this point. We do agree,
however, that sorting out the conditions under
which we observe a gap is a necessary precursor
to understanding the nature of the gap. We also
agree that endowment effect theory and pros-
pect theory most likely do not explain observed
WTP-WTA gaps. Finally, claims that WTP-
WTA gaps are unrelated to experimental proce-
dures are clearly misleading.18
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